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Summary: Following foreign bank entry, credit interest rates have been extremely high 
in Serbia compared with a reference group of countries: Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
This is connected with monetary authorities’ poor predictions regarding the behavior of 
those banks in setting interest rates, creating an illusion that competition, per se, would 
rapidly result in decreasing interest rates; as well as undertaking monetary policy meas-
ures--such as an extreme increase in the reserve requirements rate--that contributed to 
unchanged or increased credit interest rates. The final outcome of poor predictions and 
measures undertaken by the National Bank of Serbia is limited to periodical appeals by 
its highest officials to citizens to consider the conditions under which they borrow from 
banks. However, under conditions of fully inelastic demand for bank credit and a cartel 
presence in the banking sector, such appeals are ineffective, merely reflecting an attempt 
to avoid responsibility for a possible wave of bankruptcies in the household sector. Only 
increasing competition among banks can lead to a significant decrease in credit interest 
rates in Serbia in the medium term. Empirical analysis shows that competition should be 
most intensive on the mortgage loan market. 
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Critical judgement on unfounded announcements of the highest officials of Na-
tional Bank of Serbia and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Serbia of a 
rapid decrease in bank credit interest rates that I passed in June 2005, has been 
unambiguously confirmed by the results of my latest empirical analysis.  
The problem stems from bad predictions of monetary authorities con-
cerning the behaviour of foreign banks with regard to credit interest rate forma-
tion, creating an illusion that the competition among banks would rapidly result 
in a reduction in interest rates in Serbia, as well as monetary policy measures, 
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such as an extreme increase in reserve requirements, which contributed to credit 
interest rates remaining unchanged, or increasing in certain periods. 
It all happened in conditions of non-existance of thoroughly worked out 
mechanisms for the protection of banking sector competition, which would pro-
tect the users of bank services even with a predominant cartel in the banking sec-
tor, i.e. the tacit agreement between the largest banks concerning the interest rate 
levels.  
This paper deals, firstly, with bank ownership structure and the behav-
iour of bank credit interest rates in the EU candidate countries; secondly, with 
bank ownership structure and the behaviour of interest rates in Serbia; thirdly, 
with implications of high interest rate mark-ups in the banking sector in Serbia; 
and fourthly, with prospects for bank credit interest rate reduction in Serbia.   
 
 
1. Bank Ownership Structure and the Behavior of Bank Credit Interest 
Rates in the EU Candidate Countries 
 
A thorough discussion of the behaviour of bank credit interest rates in different 
stages of transition is not possible without taking into consideration the pace of the 
banking sector privatisation process in the relevant group of countries comparable 
to Serbia. Figure 1 shows a summary of bank privatisation results in three EU 
candidate countries – Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania.
1 Since Serbia is yet to be 
given the EU candidate status, it makes sense to compare these three countries.  
 
Figure  1. The ownership structure of the banking sector in Croatia, Bulgaria 
and Romania 
Country Description 
Croatia  In the late 2000, about 84% of the banking sector assets was foreign owned, 
whereas in 1995 there was no foreign ownership. At the end of 2000, all ten 
major banks were foreign owned. The concentration is extremely high: in 
2000, Zagrebačka banka a.d. and Privredna banka Zagreb a.d. accounted for 
47.2% of the balance sum total of the banking sector.   
Bulgaria  In the late 2000, foreigners became majority owners of 8 out of 10 largest 
banks.  
Romania  Compared to the previous two countries, Romania lagged behind in bank 
privatisation. In 2000, foreigners owned less that 50% of the banking sector 
assets. Two out of three largest banks remained state-owned until 2003. The 
government decided to sell the controlling stake of the largest bank, Banca 
Comerciala Romana (BCR), to foreigners, the transaction with the buyer 
(Erste Bank) was to be finalised by the end of October 2006.
* 
Source: Factiva, Reuters, September 22, 2006. 
                                                  
1 In September 2006, the European Commission announced that Bulgaria and Romania would 
become EU members as of 1
st January 2007.  Analysis of Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on Credit Interest Rate Behavior in Serbia 
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In the late 1990s, the process of the banking sector privatisation was in-
tensive in two out of three observed countries (Figure 1). At the end of 2002, 
75% of the total banking sector assets was foreign controlled in Croatia and Bul-
garia. The bank privatisation process was slower only in Romania. In addition, 
the process of selling the largest Romanian bank, BCR, to Erste Bank, a transac-
tion worth EUR 3.75b, was hotly disputed, so that the sale was expected to be 
finalised during October 2006 at best.    
In order to understand the effects of foreign bank entry on consumer and 
corporate credit interest rates in three relevant countries comparable to Serbia, it 
is necessary to show the dynamics of relevant interest rates. When comparing 
the level of interest rates in Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, official data were 
used referring to euro and/or foreign currency credit interest rates, which is the 
only way to provide an objective picture.
2 
 
Table 1. Bank interest rates on kuna credits with foreign currency clause in 






Corporate     Consumer 
Long-term credits 
 
Corporate                 Consumer 
                  Total  
                   average  Housing 












  August 
21.09               18.10 
13.54               17.21  
11.10               13.59 
  9.54               11.30 
  8.72               11.37 
  7.00                 8.66 
  7.09                 8.47   
  6.34                 7.65  
  6.29                 8.33 
   
6.96                 6.19  
                                            
15.79         10.48       - 
10.46         11.65       - 
  9.41         11.64       - 
  7.52         10.79       - 
  6.37          9.50      7.42   
  5.76          8.04      6.02 
  5.55          7.73      5.71 
  5.18          6.95      5.00 
  6.21          6.22      4.75 
   
6.28          6.46      4.92 
                   
Source: Hrvatska narodna banka (HNB), www.hnb.hr 
Note: In 2003, Erste Bank offered 30-year long-term housing credits at the annual inter-
est rate of 4.99% with a CHF clause. 
 
It is important to stress that interest rates on kuna credits with foreign 
currency clause in Croatia, as a predominant form of credit, were much higher in 
the late 2004 (Table 1) compared with the interest rates of the EMU countries 
(Table 2), despite the fact that inflation rate was somewhat higher than in the 
                                                  
2 Latest available monthly data are used, the end of  August 2007.  Đorđe Đukić 
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EMU countries. Annual increase in retail prices in Croatia in October 2004 was 
2.7% per cent, only by 0.3 percentage points higher relative to a retail price in-
crease in Eurozone.
3 It took Croatia five years to halve the level of the shown 
interest rates. Banking competition in Croatia was most fierce in consumer 
mortgage credit market, which results from the fact that in mid-2006, five and a 
half years after the domination of foreign banks in Croatian market, interest rates 
on these credits were not significantly above the average of the EMU countries.   
 
Table 2. Interest rates of the EMU credit institutions (December, %) 
 
Consumer credits, %  
 
 Year 
   Bank overdrafts     Consumer                 Housing 
                                 credits                       credits                         







  Sep.  
 
  9.69                           7.64                           4.89 
  9.51                           7.24                           4.41 
  9.67                           6.75                           4.03 
 10.03                          7.56                           4.49                             
  
 10.56                           8.47                          4.98 
 
Non-finance corporation credits, %       
Year     Bank overdrafts      Other credits            Other credits over 
                                  up to EUR 1m.          EUR  1m.                       







  Sep. 
   
 
    5.58                            4.03                          3.12 
    5.26                            3.97                          3.05 
    5.12                            3.98                          3.22 
    5.80                            5.08                          4.50 
    
    6.49                            5.93                          5.20 
     
Source: European Central Bank (ECB), www.ecb.int 
Note: Weighted average interest rates, referring to all new client-credit institution trans-
actions. 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, interest rates on new euro credits that were 
applied by credit institutions in Bulgaria, were extremely high in the period 
2003-2005, not only compared to EMU, but also to Croatia. There were no sig-
nificant changes in the observed months in 2006. Obviously, even when a coun-
                                                  
3 Source: HNB, Bilten 102, March 2005, p. 18. Analysis of Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on Credit Interest Rate Behavior in Serbia 
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try has had a currency board regime for a number of years, there is no guarantee 
that the level of bank credit interest rates will decrease quickly and approximate 
the level of the country or the zone whose currency the credit is tied to. In Bul-
garia in December 2004, natural persons were charged an annual interest rate of 
9.79% on short-term euro credits, whereas companies were charged 7.47%, de-
spite the fact that the average annual inflation rate in the previous year was only 
2.3%.
4 In September 2007, these interest rates were not only reduced relative to 
those of December 2004, but they increased, especially those charged on short-
term corporate credits, which rose even more substantially.    
Obviously, monetary stability is a necessary but not a sufficient condi-
tion for the achievement of low bank credit interest rates. Without a proper 
analysis of the market structure and the behaviour of demand for credits, i.e. the 
level of competition in the banking sector of a given country after foreign bank 
entry, it is not possible to objectively assess the behaviour of bank credit interest 
rates.  
  
Table 3. Interest rates of credit institutions in Bulgaria (new loans in EUR, De-
cember, %) 
Year              Natural persons 
Overdrafts      ST           LT 
      Non-finance corporations  







  Sep.  
 
 
11.75            10.38         12.26 
12.60             9.79          10.01 
  9.80             7.43            7.48 
  9.49             8.30            7.89 
  
  9.64            12.58           7.53 
 
  8.41             6.10        8.38 
  6.04             7.47        8.02  
  5.38             6.49        7.72 
  7.07             8.39        8.23 
  
  7.41             8.32        8.15 
Source: Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), www.bnb.bg 
Abbreviations: ST- short-term credits; LT- long-term credits. 
Note: Average interest rates on long-term housing credits in levs in this period ranged 
from the highest level of 12.62% in December 2003, to a record low of 6.88% in De-
cember 2005 and 8.50% in December 2006 and 8.37% in September 2007. 
 
Although Romania never resorted to a currency board regime and de-
spite the fact that the bank privatisation process was slower compared to that in 
Bulgaria, the level of short-term credit interest rates charged on new loans in 
euros was similar to that of interest rates charged to natural persons in Bulgaria, 
except in December 2005. However, for legal persons, the level of interest rates 
was substantually lower.  
 
 
                                                  
4 Source: BNB, Macroeconomic Review, www.bnb.bg  Đorđe Đukić 
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Table 4. Interest rates of credit institutions in Romania (new loans in EUR, De-
cember, %) 
Year Natural  persons 
 
Average  ≤ 1 m.  6-12months  > 5 
years                                   
                        
Legal persons 
 
Average  ≤ 1 m. 6-12months
*    > 5   
                                                   








  Sep. 
   
 
10.5       11.8         9.3          9.9 
  9.9         8.6         8.7          9.5 
  8.6       15.1         9.6          8.4 
  8.6          -          10.1          8.4 
   
  7.8          -            6.2          7.8 
   
 
6.6         6.0        6.3            5.3 
6.3         5.2        6.2            7.5 
5.9         5.8        5.7            7.7 
6.8           -          6.3            8.2 
 
7.2           -          6.9            7.6 
Source: National Bank of Romania (RNB), www.bnro.ro  
* For 2006 and 2007 up and including 12 months. 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, in the period December 2003-September 
2007, for example, natural persons were charged an interest rate of 8.7% to 
10.1% on 6-12 month credits, whereas legal persons were charged 5.3% to 8.2% 
annual interest rate.  
 
 
2. Bank Ownership Structure in Serbia and the Behavior of Credit Interest 
Rates 
 
The changes in the banking sector ownership structure, in terms of a share of the 
ten largest banks in the balance sum total of the banking sector in Serbia in the 











 Analysis of Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on Credit Interest Rate Behavior in Serbia 
  435 
Table 5. Percentage share of individual banks in the balance sum total of the 













Raiffeisenbank Jugoslavija a.d. 
Delta bank a.d./ Banca Intesa A.D. 
Beograd 
Komercijalna bank a.d. Beograd 
Vojvodjanska bank a.d.
* 
Societe General Yugoslav Bank a.d.  
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank 
Jubanka a.d. Beograd 
AIK bank a.d. Niš 
HVB bank Serbia and Montenegro 
a.d. Beograd 
ProCredit bank a.d. 









































Note: Calculated according to the Narodna banka Srbije (NBS) data base. 
* This bank is privatised currently. National Bank of Greece is majority shareholder. 
 
On 30 September 2004, five domestic banks with domestic capital ac-
counted for 35.02% of the balance sum total of the Serbian banking sector, 
whereas five domestic banks with foreign capital accounted for 28.38%. The 
situation significantly changed in the late 2005. In the meantime, the state sold 
its majority stake of Jubanka, a.d. Belgrade to Greek Alpha Bank, A.E., whereas 
Delta banka, a.d.. Beograd, second largest bank in Serbia, was bought by Banca 
Intesa from Italy. This inevitably resulted in a dominant position of foreign-
controlled banks in domestic market, measured by their balance sum as a share 
of balance sum total of five, as well as ten, largest banks in Serbia.  
On 31 December 2005, five largest banks accounted for 49.31% of the 
balance sum total of the banking sector in Serbia. The degree of concentration in 
the banking sector in Serbia did not significantly change relative to the end of 
September 2004. In addition, at the end of 2005, a share of the balance sum of 
foreign-controlled banks within five largest banks increased to 68.61%. The only 
two banks in this group with a majority of domestic capital - Komercijalna 
banka a.d. Beograd and Vojvođanska banka a.d. – accounted for 31.39% of the 
balance sum total of this group.   
That the entry of foreign banks into the domestic market did not result in 
a rapid fall in bank credit interest rates, as was predicted by highest-ranked offi-
cials of the NBS and the Serbian Ministry of Finance, is confirmed by the data 
shown in Table 6. In December 2003, citizens were charged an average interest Đorđe Đukić 
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rate of 24.66% on short-term credits, whereas in December 2005, the average 
annual interest rate was 25.24%. In September 2007, interest rates rose to 
30.47%. In December 2003, consumer credit interest rates were 20.27%, while 
in December 2005 they were 19.71%. They increased in September 2007 to 
21.89%, after significant reduction in December 2006.  
Although reduced to the level of 6.30% annually, housing credit interest 
rates were in December 2005 in Serbia substantially higher relative to those in 
Croatia. Housing credits in Serbia involve government-subsidised credits with 
the effective interest rate of 5.18 to 5.33%. Due to this, the average interest rate 
on these credits decreased to 6.30% in late 2005. However, commercial housing 
credit interest rates are still high compared to those in Croatia, where they were 
reduced to under 5% in May. In this way, out of all mentioned countries, Croatia 
most closely approached the level of housing credit interest rates in the EMU 
countries (Table 2). Therefore, during the last five years, the competition among 
foreign banks has had the greatest impact on the mortgage credit market, which 
will also happen in Serbia.  
In July 2005, these interest rates increased in Serbia to an annual level of 
6.67%, making the difference relative to Croatia even greater. The situation is 
unchanged in September 2007. 
 
Table 6. Bank interest rates in Serbia  (December, %) 
Consumer credits:                                                                   
  Short-term            Consumer                Housing 
 
 credits                   credits                     credits  






  Sep. 
   
24.66                        20.27                        7.67 
23.88                        27.37                        8.08 
25.24                        19.71                        6.30 
29.50                        14.54                        6.80 
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Corporate credits:                                                                   
  Short-term            Short-term               Long-term  
export                   agricultural and       credits for buying 
credits                   stock credits            and selling locally 






  Sep. 
   
16.83                       19.58                        11.13 
16.75                       14.19                        10.38 
13.09                       13.22                          8.43 
11.13                       19.16                          8.56 
 
13.55                       12.06                        10.31             
Source: NBS, Statistički bilten, Septembar 2007, www.nbs.yu  
Note: Weighted average interest rates on credits approved in a given month. The NBS 
does not implement the methodology of presenting foreign currency clause credit inter-
est rates, despite the predominance of this credit type.    
 
Therefore, observing the dynamics of bank credit interest rates at the 
end of 2005 and during 2006 and 2007, we can conclude that consumer bank 
credit interest rates in Serbia are still extremely high compared to those in Croa-
tia, Bulgaria and Romania, i.e. the group of countries comparable with Serbia. 
The only exception are housing credit interest rates. As can be seen from Table 
6, corporate credit interest rates in Serbia are drastically higher compated to 
those in the three observed countries.   
 
 
3. Implications of High Interest Rate Spread in Banking Sector of Serbia 
 
By purchasing domestic banks in Serbia, foreign banks did not buy their share 
capital, but a part of domestic market. If they buy a share of the market, foreign 
banks want to pay off as soon as possible the costly "entrance ticket" through 
extremely high difference between interest payable and interest receivable, espe-
cially in retail banking. They regarded Serbia as an atractive region in which 
they could make extremely high profits relative to the neighbouring countries, 
which is their legitimate goal. The tacit agreement between the leading banks 
controlling the prevailing consumer banking service market share in Serbia only 
made this goal easier to achieve. The undisputable proof of the presence of that 
cartel is the fact that interest rate spread is not decreasing. It has been more or 
less unchanged for years.  
As can be seen from Table 7, in the period December 2005 – September 
2007 also, interest rate spread in the banking sector of Serbia ranged from 10.82 
to 7.83 percentage poins. It reached a record low in December 2005, only to be 
increased in July 2006 to 11.27 percentage points and to 10.82 in December Đorđe Đukić 
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2006. For comparison, according to most recent available data, the interest rate 
spread of the overall banking sector in Croatia decreased to 6.7 percentage 
points in November 2005, whereas in the EU countries it was four to five times 
lower than that in Serbia.  
 
Table 7. Interest rate spread in the banking sector of Serbia  (December, %) 
Year  Interest receivable        Interest payable               Interest  
on total credits              on total deposits              spread 






  Sep. 
 
   
     14.81                                     2.74                     12.07 
     14.59                                     3.60                     10.99 
     14.41                                     3.71                     10.70 
     15.88                                     5.06                     10.82 
      
     11.79                                     3.96                       7.83     
Source: NBS. 
Note:  Weighted average interest rates.  
 
The illusion of a rapid fall in bank interest rates is best confirmed by 
movements in the interest rate spread in the banking sector of Serbia (Table 7). 
From a record high of 12.07 percentage points in the late 2003, it somewhat de-
creased in late 2005 – to 10.70 percentage points. In December 2006, it rose to 
as much as 10.82 percentage points. This only shows that after their entry on 
Serbian market, foreign banks have made use of a double advantage of making 
large profits in the domestic market:  
  imposing low interest payable on deposits, when DEM was ex-
changed for EUR, in conditions of a total loss of confidence in do-
mestic banks with domestic capital;  
  imposing high interest receivable due to insufficient competition in 
the domestic market, especially in retail banking, with consumers, 
trying to solve their basic problems, ignore the cost of credit. 
 
High interest rate spread was the main reason for entering of foreign 
banks into the Croatian
5 market, just like the Serbian one. The movements of 
interest rate spread in Croatia are shown in Table 8. If  the interest rate spread of 
kuna credits and foreign currency clause credits is observed, we may conclude 
that it was substantially reduced in December 2005 relative to the same month in 
2003 – from 3.59 to 2.18 percentage points.  
                                                  
5 Haan de J. and I. Naaborg, ibid, p. 189. Analysis of Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on Credit Interest Rate Behavior in Serbia 
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Interest rate spread in the banking sector of Serbia was 7.83 percentage 
points in September 2007, which is still sigfnificantly higher than in Croatia. 
 
Tabela 8. Interest rate spread in the banking sector of Croatia  (December, %) 
Year  Interest rates on kuna        Interest rates on                 Interest rate  
credits with foreign           kuna deposits with             spread 
currency clause                 foreign currency clause       
(total average)                  (total average)       






  August 
      7.07                                      3.48                         3.59 
      6.89                                      4.17                         2.72 
      6.17                                      3.99                         2.18 
      6.30                                      3.67                         2.63 
       
      6.46                                      3.96                         2.50                             
Source: HNB. 
 
By increasing reserve requirements, the NBS only caused commercial 
banks to increase their interest rates, or, at best, to maintain them at the same 
level, without giving up space for extreme profit-making during the observed 
period, due to high demand for consumer and corporate credits. In the first quar-
ter of 2006 only, relative to the end of 2005, foreign indebtedness of Serbian 
banks increased by about EUR 330m, which fully confirms the thesis of excep-
tional profit-making possibilities compared to domicile countries. For example, 
Raiffeisen International, a member of RZB Group, recorded an increase in prof-
its (after tax) of 83% in 2005 compared to that in 2004, thanks to its operations 
in Central and Eastern Europe countries such as Croatia and Serbia. It is ex-
pected that this bank will record a return on equity after tax of more than 25%.
6 
It can be seen from Table 9 that the total amount of consumer credits un-
til July 2006 inclusive recorded a continuously high increase, despite the NBS 
measures undertaken to substantially slow down a rise in these aggregates. In 
December 2005, compared to the same month in 2004, the total amount of con-
sumer credits almost doubled, whereas in July 2006, it increased by 33.35% 
compared to December 2005. The fastest increase was recorded in long-term 
(housing) consumer credits. At the end of 2005, compared to the late 2004, the 
total amount of these credits increased 2.11 times. In September 2007 compared 




                                                  
6 Source: Annual Report RI 2005, www.rzbgroup.com 
 Đorđe Đukić 
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Tabela 9. The amount of bank consumer credits in Serbia (December, mil. di-
nars) 
Period  Short-term     Long-term     Interest and          TOTAL 
credits              credits         commission         (1+2+3) 
                                             income                             
                                                   






  Sep. 
11,264              17,274              105                    28,643 
15,278              49,006              157                    64,441 
20,985            103,513              439                  124,937 
38,827            163,631                827                203,285 
 




A majority of Serbian citizens ignores the cost of short-term credits, 
which is partly connected with the necessity of solving basic household prob-
lems. Credit refinancing  is becoming increasingly frequent, thus creating a vi-
cious circle in which the highest price is paid by the poorest layers of population. 
The debt is exponentially increasing, which can be seen from Table 10. While at 
the end of December 2004, debt per employed person was EUR 398, in Septem-
ber 2007 it rose to EUR 1,826. It is obviously a dramatic rise in citizen indebt-
edness, those who are employed, which is best confirmed by a statistic that the 
total indebtedness per employed person in Serbia rose at the end of September 
2007 to 5.11 average net salaries.     
 
Tabela 10. Consumer indebtedness in Serbia (December) 
Year Indebtedness  per  employed 
person (in EUR)  
The ratio of indebteness per 
employed person to average 




  Sep 
   398 





    2.23 
    2.75 
     
    5.11 
Note: The author's calculation according to the NBS and the Republic Bureau of Statis-
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4. Prospects for Decreasing Bank Credit Interest Rates in Serbia 
 
Starting from rough measures the NBS have undetaken in the previous period in 
the form of increasing reserve requirements rate, the assessment that in the pe-
riod to come nothing will substantially change in this regard, as well as the un-
disputable thesis that the cartel is still dominant in the banking sector in Serbia, 
we can conclude that the competition among banks will not result in a consider-
able fall in consumer credit interest rates in the next year. There will be some 
partial positive shifts in this regard, especially concerning housing credits, al-
though interest rates charged on commercial housing credits (without govern-
ment subsidies) will be substantially higher than those in Croatia.  
The National Bank of Serbia manifested its incapacity when it increased 
the rate of reserve requirements on external borrowing and deposits from abroad 
with maturity of up to 2 years from 40% to 60% as of 10 May 2006. It happened 
after it withdrew 11.5 billion dinars at two securities auctions in order to curb 
inflation which in April was 15.6%, as opposed to a forecast annual rate of 
9.8%. At the auction held on the day when the decision about a hike in reserve 
requirements was announced (May 8, 2006), the NBS withdrew additional 6 bil-
lion dinars.
7  
  If at the beginning of May 2006 banks could buy non-risk securities 
from the NBS at an average annual weighted repo rate of 23.89% for securities 
with 61 day maturity, or at the rate of 20.90% for securities with 14 day matur-
ity, which is substantially higher relative to the end of 2005, then it wasn't justi-
fied to expect banks to reduce their interest rates charged on new consumer and 
corporate credits. Just the opposite, it was logical to expect banks to increase 
them in the period to come, which is exactly what actually happened. Average 
interest rate applied to the securities subject to open market operations of the 
National bank of Serbia in period January-July 2006 ranged from the highest 
22.26% at the end of April to the lowest 20.51% at the end of July.  
Such a setting resulted in further external borrowing of banks, which 
must be treated as a part of the total Serbia's debt. Due to an extremely high in-
terest rate spread possible to achieve in Serbia, all measures undertaken by the 
NBS to stop further external borrowing of banks proved to be futile, which could 
have have been predicted from the experience of Croatia. In December 2006, 
total external debt of banks amounted to about EUR 3.89 b. Relative to Decem-
ber 2005, it rose by 74 %.  Bad predictions of monetary authorities undoubtedly 
suggest incompetence of individuals in the NBS bodies.
8  
                                                  
7 Source: www.nbs.yu 
 
8 It can be seen from the biographies presented to the members of the Serbian Parliament that out 
of five elected members of the National Bank of Serbia Council in its first term, four of them have Đorđe Đukić 
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Consequently, the final outcome of bad predictions and measures under-
taken by the NBS is that banks were required as of 15 March 2004, to uniformly 
calculate and disclose effective interest rates on loans and deposits, so that bank 
clients are fully aware of the cost of credit, as well as occasional appeals of the 
highest NBS officials to the citizens to be fully informed about the borrowing 
conditions (interest rate level, commissions, etc.). At the end of August 2006, the 
NBS announced a list of banks which calculated a foreign currency clause credit 
instalment using the unfavouranle (higher) exchange rate of the euro, despite the 
appreciation of the dinar against the euro. However, in conditions of fully inelas-
tic demand for consumer credits, these appeals were eventually useless and pre-
sent an attempt to avoid responsibility for a possible wave of bankruptcies in the 
household sector, already experienced in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, 
etc.  
Therefore, an increasing competition among banks is the only factor that 
could lead to a considerable reduction in lending interest rates in medium term. 
The fact that supports this point is that Banca Intesa announced an agressive be-
haviour in the domestic market and focusing on rendering services to citizenship 
in order to increase its share from the current 12% to 20%. Giovanni Boccolini, 
Head of International Subsidiary Banks of Banca Intesa, explicitly said that their 
aim is to outperform their main competitor, Raiffeisenbank.
9 Until September 
2006 inclusive, however, this aggressive behaviour of Banca Intesa in practice, 
with regard to dictating lower interest rates on consumer credits, haven't been 
noticed.  
Foreign owned banks will start to implement internal credit risk models 
(Bazel II) as advanced risk management technique, as their parent companies 
will do that, adjusting to the EU requirements in the form of Bazel II. Therefore, 
it is logical to expect that foreign banks (daughters) will lead in client classifica-
tion according to credit risk exposure in such a way that first-class clients will 
pay a lower cost of credit.  
                                                                                                                      
never engaged in monetary and banking issues. In addition, according to the National Bank of 
Serbia Act,  they are authorised, at the Governor's suggestion, to elect vice-governors, who, being 
the Monetary Board members, make key decisions in the monetary and banking area, as well as to 
supervise the governor's work. Therefore, incompetent members of Monetary Board elect the most 
responsible people in the Central Bank and supervise the Governor! What effective control of 
distribution of power in the public interest can we talk about if, according to the coalition agree-
ment, one party (G17 plus) is allowed not only to control the NBS (through proposing candidates 
for Governor), but also all other key financial institutions in Serbia -  Ministry of Finance, Securi-
ties Commission, Agency for Deposit Insurance, Rehabilitation, Bankruptcy and Liquidation of 
Banks, etc?! According to new Constitution, when defining the NBS decision-making bodies, it is 
possible to establish mechanisms which will thwart manipulations by individuals or coalitions. 
The proposal of how to define the position of the NBS in the new Constitution was sent by the 
author to authorised institutions in March 2005. (See Đukić, Đ, 2006, pp. 198-202). 
9 See “Foreign banks target Serbia”, Dow Jones & Reuters, Factiva, 28 March 2005. Analysis of Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on Credit Interest Rate Behavior in Serbia 
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Considering the fact that the banks's implementation of internal risk rat-
ings models should result in smaller risk-based capital requirements for mort-
gage loans, it is logical to expect these banks to be the first to offer housing cred-
its in Serbia at a lower effective interest rate, using this as their comparative ad-
vantage over majority domestic capital banks. To what extent this will foster 
competition in mortgage credit market is yet to be seen. In any case, this will 
serve as another test of the exsistence of tacit agreement between the largest 
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